Abstract. After the definition of a 'tempered realism' which rejects a priori ontological propositions, it is shown that basic statements belonging to 'orthodox' interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, are realist in a stronger sense because they insert ontological statements -like those about the existence of the 'superposition' state or of the 'entangled' state -in the postulates of the theory. A discussion of EPR issues suggests that descriptions containing only statements about state vectors and experiments outputs are the most suitable for Quantum Mechanics: if we follow this prescription, we find that the concept of non -locality with its 'instantaneous action at a distance' evaporates. Finally, it is argued that usual treatments of philosophical realist positions end up in the construction of theories whose major role is that of being disproved by experiment. This confutation proves simply that the theories are wrong; no conclusion about realism (or any other philosophical position) can be drawn, since experiments deal always with theories and these are never logical consequences of philosophical positions.
Introduction
The question of the (im)possible coexistence between realism and Quantum Mechanics goes back to the birth of the latter; however, the addressed issues and the relevance given to them have changed over the times. From a discussion about the epistemological status of Quantum Mechanics, the debate has shifted to specialized topics connected to the so called EPR paradox:
(1) the turning points have been the paper by Bell on his inequalities (2) and the Aspect's experiment on EPR correlated photons pairs. (3) After the definition of a tempered realism, this paper deals with some basic features of the 'orthodox' interpretation(s) of Quantum Mechanics and of the EPR issues with the aim of shedding some light -of different color from the usual ones -on these questions.
Which realism?
Science has developed on the basis of three main assumptions:
There is an external World whom the observer belongs to.
P2 Causality principle.
P3 The World behaves constantly in the same way (phenomena are reproducible).
The epistemic status of these assumptions is different: the first is a reasonable hypothesis; the second has proved to be a methodological principle of great euristic value; the third has been sustained by centuries of scientific work (however, we must be ready to abandon it on the basis of new observations). These same assumptions constitute the foundations of a rationally oriented common sense and guide us in our daily and laboratory life. Assumption (P1) demands an answer to a basic question: which are the relationships between scientific descriptions of the World (or part of it) and the external World? Answering this question amounts to skecth a 'theory of scientific knowledge': whatever it would be, this theory must be independent from the various disciplines, their theories and experimental results.
The descriptions of Science in its mature stage come in form of theories which use two basic types of concepts: theoretical entities and quantities. Example of theoretical entities are the concepts of 'electron' in Physics, or of 'neuron' in Biology. Quantities describe properties of theoretical entities. For instance, mass, charge, spin and magnetic moment describe properties of the theoretical entity 'electron'; resting and threshold potential describe properties of the theoretical entity 'neuron'. In general, quantities can be measured.
A measurement can be defined as a set of procedures that allow to attribute to a quantity a definite value (within a range of experimental inaccuracy). Within a theory, the result of a measurement of the quantity G that describes a property of the theoretical entity E depends on the interaction between the theoretical entity E and the apparatus A (also considered as a theoretical entity): the result of the measurement depends on the property of the theoretical entity E described by the quantity G. As an example, let us consider the measurement of the mass of an ion with a mass spectrometer: the outcome of the measurement depends on a property (which we call 'mass') of the ions we are using. In this case, our acquired knowledge suggests that the apparatus does not influence the result of the measurement. However, this is not, in general, the case. Two examples: the insertion of an ammeter in an electrical circuit changes its electrical resistance and, therefore, the measured value of the current is different from that of the circuit without the ammeter; as we shall see, in atomic physics, some measurements change the value of the measured quantity (we are not referring to the uncertainty relations).
On the basis of assumption (P1), we state that the result of the measurement reflects a property P Q E of a quid Q E that, in the World, corresponds to the theoretical entity E. However: the fact that we measure the quantity G associated to the theoretical entity E does not allow us to state that the quid Q E which, in the World, corresponds to E, is exactly E and that P Q E is exactly the property that our theory attributes to E. We can only establish a correspondence between theoretical entities and quid and properties of theoretical entities and properties of quid. For instance, we can say that in the World there is a quid that corresponds to our theoretical entity 'electron': this means that in the World there is a quid that has properties that correspond to the properties attributed by our theory to the 'electron' and that this quid behaves in accordance with the laws of our theory and with properties that are described by the measured values of the quantities G ′ s that our theory attributes to the 'electron'. We can convene that the statement 'the electron exists in the World' is simply and only a shorthand of the previous one.
Ontological statements, like the previous one about the existence of the electron, can be made only a posteriori; though they can not be deduced by logical chains from the acquired knowledge, they must be compatible with it; therefore, ontological statements can be only plausible. For instance, while nowadays the statement 'the electron exists' (as a shorthand of the longer one given above) is plausible, the statement 'the aether exists' cannot be reasonably considered as compatible with our acquired knowledge.
We shall define as a 'realist' one who accepts the assumption 'there is an external World whom the observer belongs to'. It is, of course, a loose definition that allows many types of positions.
We shall define as a 'tempered realist' one who agrees with the analysis given above of the process of measurement with its implications; in particular, a 'tempered realist' agrees with the above definition and use of ontological statements. A 'tempered realist' rejects naive realist assumptions. For instance, let us consider a theory that, like classical electromagnetism, is in good agreement with experiments (in its domain of application). We conclude that the phenomena described by classical electromagnetism happen in the World exactly as described by our theory. This conclusion is in contrast with the analysis of the process of measurement outlined above; furthermore, we should know, independently from our theory, that in the World things happen exactly as described by our theory. This kind of naive realism can be denoted as 'realism of theories'. Other naive assumptions consist in attributing to the World general or particular feature of our theories: we shall deal later with some interesting examples.
Given the problematic nature of a realist stand, one could ask: why realist descriptions? Possible answers:
♮ because we are realist in our everyday and laboratory life;
♮ because any description of experiments is a realist report; ♮ because, scientists are, sometimes in spite of their declarations, realist;
♮ because an image of the World, based on realist assumptions, guides the experimenter in his laboratory and the theorist in building up theories.
Realism and Quantum Mechanics
Since Quantum Mechanics makes statements about the World, it is a realist description in the precise, following sense:
♮ it is interpreted on the basis of, at least, the basic realist assumption (P 1): 'there is an external World whom the observer belongs to';
♮ it describes experiments and uses experimental reports (descriptions and reports of experiments are realist discourses).
Furthermore, we shall see that basic statements contain also additional (and questionable) realist assumptions. We shall denote a class of statements as (QM 0 ) and another class as (QM 1 ): the former being characterized by the basic realist assumption (P 1) and the (unavoidable) realist descriptions or reports of experiments; the latter, instead, uses also additional ontological assumptions.
As a basic case, let us consider a two states system S described by the state vector:
where 1 and 2 label the two states of S (the factor 1/ √ 2 implies that the two states are equally probable). Let us further suppose that the eigenvalue of a physical quantity A of the system described by the eigenvector |ψ 1 > is a 1 and, correspondingly, a 2 for |ψ 2 >.
Here are two possible interpretations of equation (1): S1 The system S is described by the state vector (1) . If a measure of the physical quantity A is made on the system S, then the probability of finding a 1 or a 2 is 1/2. This is a statement of the (QM 0 ) type, because it contains only assertions about state vectors and experiment outputs.
S2
The system S is in a 'superposition state'; the system S does possess, before the measurement, neither the properties associated with the state 1 nor those associated with the state 2; the process of measurement causes the passage from the 'superposition state' to the state |ψ 1 > or |ψ 2 > with the associated properties.
(S2) is clearly a statement of (QM 1 ) type, because -in the language of a 'tempered realist' -it contains the ontological assertion about the existence, in the World, of a quid Q S corresponding to the theoretical entity S that finds itself in a particular state that is neither the one described by |ψ 1 > nor that described by |ψ 2 >, but a 'superposition' of both. Without this ontological assumption, it would be impossible to state that 'the system S does possess, before the measurement, neither the properties associated with the state 1 nor those associated with the state 2'. The predictions of Quantum Mechanics depends only on the form of the state vector (1). The ontological statement about the existence of the superposition state is not used in the deduction chain that leads to the predictions of the theory: it can be dropped without changing these predictions. The insertion of the ontological statement about the existence of the 'superposition' state in the formal premises of the theory leads to an ontological fallacy: from the agreement between the predictions of the theory and the experiments it is argued that the ontological statement is true (in this case that the 'superposition' state exists). This is a fallacious argument because the predictions of the theory depends uniquely on its equations and can be obtained without using the ontological statement. As a general methodological rule, ontological statements should be withdrawn from the postulates of a theory: as suggested in section 2, ontological statements should be made only a posteriori and are only plausible.
A tempered realist rejects (S2) because it attributes a priori to the physical system S a property of our description of it, i.e. the fact that its state vector is a 'superposition' of two state vectors. Not casually, (S2) leads directly to Schrödinger's 'cat paradox', to all its variations and extravagant implications. If we use (S1) instead, we shall avoid any trouble.
As a second example, let us consider a beam of linearly polarized light coming out from a polaroid whose axis is, say, along the x axis. If the beam is falling on a second polaroid whose axis x ′ is tilted by an angle θ from that of the first polaroid, Quantum Mechanics predicts that each photon has a probability cos 2 θ of passing through the second polaroid.
3 Quantum Mechanics does so by describing the incoming photon with a 'superposition' of linear polarizations along two perpendicular directions x ′ , y ′ :
How can we describe the experiment? Here are two ways:
A The photon impinging on the second polaroid is linearly polarized along x since it has passed the first polaroid. This statement derives from the operational definition according to which a photon is said to be 'linearly polarized along x' if it has passed a polaroid oriented along x. Taking into account the type of experimental apparatus, we describe the photon by equation (2); the photon coming out from the first polaroid has probability cos 2 θ of passing through the second one. The interaction between the photon and the polaroid changes the polarization of the photon. This is a description of the type (QM 0 ). B The photon impinging on the second polaroid is in a superposition state described by equation (2); the second polaroid causes the photon to fall into the state |x ′ > with probability cos 2 θ. This is a description of the type (QM 1 ).
No one would reasonably sustain (B). In fact, the incoming linearly polarized photon can be described also by a state vector that is a superposition of right and left circular polarizations. Shall we say that the photon is in a superposition state of right and left circular polarizations? And, coherently, that the photon is at the same time, in a superposition state of two perpendicular linear polarizations and of two circular polarizations?
EPR issues
The debate addresses (at least) four issues: realism, locality, causality and completeness of Quantum Mechanics. Historically, the starting point has been 3 It is interesting to note that also classical electromagnetism predicts the same thing if we assume that the probability of traversing the second polaroid is proportional to the classical predicted intensity of the light passing the second polaroid. Similarly, in the case of a double slit experiment, classical electromagnetism can predict what is the probability for a photon to reach a point on the screen, if it is assumed that the probability is proportional to the classical light intensity predicted for that point. Of course, this is an ad hoc adjustment of Maxwell's theory; however, it is conceptually interesting. For a detailed discussion, showing also that even classically it is not possible to say which is the path of the energy between the slits and the screen, one might see reference (5) . 4 Also classical electromagnetism does, of course, a similar thing with the electric field.
the problem of completeness of Quantum Mechanics, posed by the already quoted paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen.
(1) In recent years the attention has been focused on EP R type experiments.
If we picks up a typical contemporary paper concerning EPR arguments, we are facing the following situation: the 'orthodox' description is presented as a 'non -realist' one; philosophical realist positions are translated into a physical theory whose equations are necessarily different, at least in some particular cases, from the ones of Quantum Mechanics; fatally, the 'realist' theory is disproved by experiments. In these papers, realist positions are characterized, among other conditions, by the statement (SR) that 'it is possible to attribute a definite value to a physical quantity of a system before the measurement'. This characterization is untenable because it is based on the assumption that (SR) is a philosophical assertion; as we shall see in a while, it is a physical assertion and, therefore, it can be tested by experiment.
Correlated pairs of photons
As a working (and well known) example, let us consider a pair of photons produced by a single atom (in a cascade process) and flying away in opposite directions (for instance ±z).
5 A typical transition used is the 4p
the first transition yields photon ν 1 = 551.3 nm, the second one yields photon ν 2 = 422.7 nm. When the photons are well apart, the photon ν 1 flying, say, along z is analyzed by polaroid A while the other photon ν 2 (flying along −z) is analyzed by polaroid B; behind the polaroids there is, of course, a photon detector. 6, 7 In rather recent experiments (9) the measurement by A is made before that of B and the distance between A and B is greater than c∆t where ∆t is the interval of time between the measurement of A and that of B. A and B make many measurements: we would like to know which is the correlation between the measurements of A and B as a function of the angle θ between their axis. Our acquired knowledge says that conservation law are valid in every single atomic event. Therefore, since the twin photons are emitted by two consecutive transitions from an initial J = 0 ( 1 S 0 ) to an intermediate J = 1 state ( 1 P 1 ) and to a final J = 0 state ( 1 S 0 ), the twin photons are both right or left circularly 5 The first EPR type measurement with photons pairs produced by a cascade emission is due to Kocher and Commins (6) . 6 Two filters, one on the z path and the other on the −z path, block the 'wrong' photons. 7 Starting from Aspect's experiment, (3) the polaroids have been replaced by birefringent analyzers; however, this complication, suggested by Bell's type inequalities known as BCHSH, (8) can be avoided here since we are interested only in the basic conceptual framework and not in hidden variables theories. polarized in a operational sense (for the angular momentum conservation).
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In our case, the beams flying along ±z are made up by a (statistically) equal number of right and left circularly polarized photons. Therefore, the beams are unpolarized, as it can be checked by using a polaroid and a quarter wavelength plate. 9,10 However, each photon possesses a definite polarization: right or left. This can be proved by the following experiment. A quarter wavelength plate and a polaroid (with its axis tilted by π/4 with respect to the optical axis of the plate in order to detect, say, right circularly polarized photons) are inserted into the photons' ±z paths (with the blocking filters). We should observe that when a photon is detected along z a photon is detected also along −z (in coincidence, if the paths' length is the same): then, we must conclude that the twin photons were right circularly polarized before their entrance into the measuring apparatus (plate plus polaroid). By rotating both polaroids by π/2, the photomultipliers will detect in coincidence only left circularly polarized photons.
The above discussion shows that statement SR above is a physical and not a philosophical one: in fact, it can be tested by experiment. 8 There is no accepted convention about the definition of right or left circular polarization. Therefore, what is right for me may be left for you; and viceversa: the reader should be careful about the convention used by looking at the equations and/or at the experimental outputs. 9 As it is well known from classical electromagnetism, it is possible to find out the polarization of a light beam by using a polaroid and a quarter wavelength plate. The beam is impinging perpendicularly on a polaroid: if, by rotating the polaroid in its plane we find that the light intensity after the polaroid does not change, we conclude that the incoming beam is either unpolarized or circularly polarized. The choice between the two possibilities is made by a second experiment. The beam is now impinging on a quarter wavelength plate perpendicularly with respect to its optical axis: if the beam is unpolarized, it will be unpolarized also after the plate and, by using again the polaroid, we will find that the light intensity after the polaroid does not change by rotating it. Instead, if the beam is right or left circularly polarized it will be transformed into a beam linearly polarized along directions tilted by ±π/4 with respect to the optical axis of the plate (the + and − signs refer to right and left circular polarizations respectively). Therefore, the intensity of the light beam after the polaroid will show two maxima and two zero minima by rotating the polaroid through 360 degrees. (The minima are null, if the polaroid is ideal).
10 A photon is either right or left with probability 1/2. If it is right, it will be, after the plate, linearly polarized along a direction a tilted by an angle π/4 with respect to the optical axis of the plate. Then, it will have a probability cos 2 θ of passing through a polaroid whose axis makes an angle θ with a. Then the probability of passing the polaroid is (1/2) cos 2 θ. If it is left, this probability will be (1/2) sin 2 θ. Since the photon is either right or left, the probability of passing through the polaroid is (1/2) cos 2 θ + (1/2) sin 2 θ = 1/2, independent of θ: the intensity of the beam does not change by rotating the polaroid.
As a matter of fact, the photon pair is described by the state vector:
where (|R >, |L >) are circular polarizations states. However, since a circularly polarized photon can be described as a combination of two linear polarizations, the above equation can be written in the form:
where (|x >, |y >) are linear polarization state vectors. We do not know, a priori, if a photon pair is composed of right or left circularly polarized photons: we only know that the photons are both right or left with the same probability. It is for these reasons that we describe the photon pair by equation (3) .
Let us now suppose that the measurement by A is made before the one made by B.
11 If the photon pair is described by (3), then the probability that photon ν 1 passes through polaroid A is (1/2); if a is the direction of the axis of A, the photon pair, after the measurement made by A, is described by the state vector:
Therefore, if polaroid B is oriented as polaroid A, photon ν 2 passes through B; if, instead, polaroid B is tilted by the angle θ with respect to polaroid A, photon ν 2 will pass through B with probability cos 2 θ (Malus law). Then the probability that photon ν 1 passes through A and photon ν 2 passes through B is given by:
This equation can, of course, be derived directly from (4) by calculating the probability that photon ν 1 passes through A and photon ν 2 passes through B without considering the details of the experiment. Let us now consider the following description:
The pair of photons produced by the source is described by the state vector (3).
(QM 0 ) B ′ The probability for ν 1 of passing through A is 1/2. If the photon ν 1 passes through polaroid A, then the photon pair is described by the state vector (5); therefore, photon ν 2 will pass through polaroid B if it is oriented as polaroid A.
(QM 0 ) C ′ If photon ν 1 passes through A, then photon ν 2 will pass through B with probability cos 2 θ, where θ is the angle between the axis of the two polaroids (Malus law).
This description uses only statements about state vectors and outcomes of measurements. Therefore, it is a description of the (QM 0 ) type; it suggests the following operational definition of correlated polarization of the photon pair:
♦ Put the two polaroids with their axis parallel. The polarization of the twin photons is said to be correlated if, for every photon pair, photon ν 1 passes through polaroid A and photon ν 2 passes through polaroid B.
With this definition, we can build up a description that explicitly considers the photons pair as a separable system:
The polarization of the photons pair produced by the source is correlated.
(QM 0 ) B ′′ Before any measurement, each pair does possess a definite value of the polarization: it is either right or left circular.
(QM 0 ) C ′′ Since photon ν 1 is right or left circularly polarized, it has probability 1/2 of passing through polaroid A.
(QM 0 ) D ′′ If photon ν 1 passes through polaroid A, since the polarization of the photon pair is correlated, then photon ν 2 passes through polaroid B if its orientation is the same as that of A; otherwise, it will pass through B with probability cos 2 θ, where θ is the angle between the axis of the two polaroids (Malus law).
Again, this description is of the (QM 0 ) type because it contains only statements about predictions, experiment outputs and the operational definition of 'correlated polarization'. (As shown above, statement (QM 0 ) B ′′ can be tested experimentally).
The 'orthodox' description is instead:
(QM 1 ) A The pair of photons produced by the source is in an entangled state whose state vector is given by (3).
(QM 1 ) B Before any measurement, each photon of the pair does not possess a definite value of the polarization.
(QM 1 ) C The probability for ν 1 of passing through A is 1/2. If the photon ν 1 passes through polaroid A, then photon ν 1 is linearly polarized along the direction of the axis of A. Contemporaneously, photon ν 2 assumes the same polarization.
(QM 1 ) D If photon ν 1 passes through A, then photon ν 2 will pass through B with probability cos 2 θ, where θ is the angle between the axis of the two polaroids (Malus law).
The 'orthodox' description is of the (QM 1 ) type because it contains the ontological assertion [(QM 1 ) A] about the existence of the entangled state.
Some comments:
C1 The primed description and the unprimed one use the same formalism: initial state vector of the photon pair and computation rules for finding the probabilities of the experimental outcomes.
C2 The 'orthodox' description (unprimed) is characterized by the ontological assertion about the existence of the 'entangled state'. This assertion, as all the ontological ones, is not used in the deductive chain that starts from equation (3) . This sentence incorporates a kind of 'instantaneous action at a distance'. It is claimed that special relativity is not violated since there is no information transport between A and B: we can verify the correlations between the measurements made by A and those made by B only by bringing together their data. However, the process under challenge is not the reading by a human observer (who collects the data of A and B) but the purported physical process according to which the polarization measured by A on photon ν 1 is instantaneously 'transmitted' to photon ν 2 : within the 'orthodox' description, without this 'transmission', the human observer who collects the data from A and B will never see the observed correlations. As a matter of fact, given the unpopularity of the instantaneous action at a distance, it is spoken of non -local effects.
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C4 Since the statement about the existence of the entangled state is an ontological one, it could be made a posteriori. Though it cannot be logically deduced by our acquired knowledge, it must be compatible with it. As shown in C3, it implies an instantaneous action at a distance that is incompatible with our acquired knowledge. Therefore, it must be dropped.
C5
The doubly primed description is conceptually interesting since, by the use of the operational definition of 'correlated polarization', it treats the photon pair as a separate system.
Causality
The causality principle has been frequently challenged after the formulation of Quantum Mechanics. It is claimed that, while probabilistic theories of classical physics reflects our ignorance about phenomena, the probabilistic nature of Quantum Mechanics reflects the undeterministic nature of quantum phenomena. The attribution of a general feature of a theory (in this case its probabilistic nature) to the World constitutes a strong realist assertion about how things behave in the World:
13 then, we are called to carefully evaluate its plausibility. However, the main point is that the 'causality principle', understood as a methodological commitment to the searching for causes, has been one of the propulsive forces of scientific knowledge: a discipline that, on the basis of hardly conclusive evidence, is really abandoning this commitment, is doomed to drain its vital sources.
Physics and philosophy
The discussion about the epistemological status of Quantum Mechanics has been characterized, since its beginnings, by the confrontation of different philosophical positions. This discussion has increasingly spread over and outside the scientific community and has produced an impressive huge number of papers and books: it is hard avoiding the feeling that this discussion has drained much more intellectual resources than deserved.
Philosophical positions can influence the ideas of a scientist to the extent of suggesting him how to build a theory or how to interpret it. The case of Quantum Mechanics is particularly interesting from this viewpoint. Quantum Mechanics is usually presented as a non -realist theory. However, we have shown that the 'orthodox' interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is realist in a stronger sense than a 'tempered' realist interpretation of it. In fact, in the basic postulates of the 'orthodox' presentation of Quantum Mechanics we find ontological statements like those about the existence of the 'superposition state' or of the 'entangled state'. We have stressed that ontological statements are never used in the deduction chain of a theory: therefore, they must be withdrawn from the postulates, since they can easily lead to ontological fallacies and/or to conclusions incompatible with our acquired knowledge (theoretical and experimental). If the misuse of ontological statements leads to paradoxical conclusions, and these conclusions are widely accepted by the scientific community, then the scientific community is opening its doors to irrational moods.
Starting from Bell's paper, (2) a bizarre game has been played: to build up theories labelled as realist; and to realize increasingly sophisticated experiments in order to disprove them. If we like, we can go on playing the game; however, since the postulates of a theory cannot be logically deduced from a philosophical position, we must be aware that experiments disprove always a theory and never a philosophy.
It is fitting to close by recalling a methodological principle by Hertz:
I have further endeavoured in the exposition to limit as far as possible the number of those conceptions which are arbitrarily introduced by us, and only admit such elements as cannot be removed or altered without at the same time altering possible experimental results. (12) In our case, the 'conceptions which are arbitrarily introduced by us' appear to be those about the existence of the 'superposition state' or of the 'entangled state' with the implication that 'we cannot attribute a definite value of a quantity to a system which is in either of those states'. If we remove these 'conceptions', our 'possible experimental results' are not 'altered'.
